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I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, physicians have made money by seeing patients. To-
day, more than in the past, physicians also make money by investing in 
the diagnostic tools and services they recommend that their patients use.1 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or the Act), 
passed as a cornerstone of President Obama’s presidency, is designed to 
protect Americans in a variety of ways, including by more stringently 
regulating physicians’ ownership of the tools and services they recom-
mend to their patients and by augmenting the disclosure requirements 
imposed on physicians when they do have a financial interest in the ser-
vices they recommend.2 
Under established statutory and ethical rules, physicians must dis-
close their ownership interests in diagnostic tools such as X-ray ma-
chines and scanning equipment, and now under the PPACA, physicians 
must put that disclosure in writing and provide a list of alternative pro-
viders their patients may see instead.3 This provision, which appears un-
controversial on its face, is not likely to draw a legal challenge. But re-
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 1. Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15, 17 (2011). 
 2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) 
(disclosure rules codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012)). On June 28, 2012, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of much of the Act, including the mandatory minimum 
coverage provision (informally referred to as the “individual mandate” provision) and the more 
stringent disclosure rules. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). The only 
portion of the Act that the Court struck down was § 1396c, which gave the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services the authority to withhold Medicaid funding from states that refused to participate in 
the Act’s Medicaid expansion. Id. at 2607. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2)(B). 
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cent research suggests that, instead of protecting patients from physi-
cians’ financial self-interest, the current disclosure requirements impose 
a great weight on patients—forcing patients to stay with physicians and 
even help physicians achieve such financial goals.4 
As shown in the American Medical Association’s 1957 “Principles 
of Medical Ethics,” there was a time when patients were protected from 
the financial self-interest of their physicians, who were expected to de-
rive professional income only from patient services.5 But in 1975, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the federal antitrust laws applied 
to all of the “learned professions,” 6  and following that decision, re-
strictions on advertising, investment, and fee-setting were invalidated, 
making physicians free to invest in the business of medicine.7 Few ob-
servers disagree that physicians should earn money for what they do, but 
many question whether physicians should have a financial interest in the 
equipment they use or the facilities to which they send their patients be-
cause the prospect of financial gain has been shown to affect the deci-
sions they make.8 
A physician’s expectation of financial gain when a patient chooses 
treatment options that the physician owns creates a classic conflict of 
interest in the physician–patient relationship.9 Studies have shown re-
peatedly that, despite their commitment to provide the best possible care 
to their patients, physicians who own diagnostic and treatment tools and 
                                                            
 4. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Con-
flicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005); Sunita Sah et al., How Doctors’ Disclosures Increase 
Patient Anxiety (Working Paper No. 1970961, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970961 
[hereinafter Sah et al., Patient Anxiety]; Sunita Sah et al., The Burden of Disclosure: Increased 
Compliance with Distrusted Advice (Working Paper No. 1615025, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615025 [hereinafter Sah et al., The Burden of Disclosure]. 
 5. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL, AM. MED. ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 7 (1958), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/ethics/1957_principles.pdf. 
 6. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975) (citing Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–
7). 
 7. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the Sherman Act 
to invalidate the AMA’s prohibition against physicians associating with “unscientific practitioners” 
including chiropractors); In re Am. Acad. of Optometry, 108 F.T.C. 25 (1986) (applying the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (1986), to prohibit the American Academy of Optome-
trists from restricting advertising, solicitation, or choice of location of practice); see also Joshua E. 
Perry, An Obituary for Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals, 23 HEALTH L. 24, 25 (2010); Sutton, 
supra note 1, at 17. 
 8. See, e.g., Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 47 (2011); Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Inter-
est: The Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 (1989) [hereinafter Rodwin, 
Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest]; Rune J. Sórensen & Jostein Grytten, Competition and Supplier-
Induced Demand in a Health Care System with Fixed Fees, 8 HEALTH ECON. 497, 497 (1999). 
 9. Marc A. Rodwin, Medical Commerce, Physician Entrepreneurialism, and Conflicts of Inter-
est, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 387, 387 (2007) [hereinafter Rodwin, Medical Com-
merce]. 
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services recommend such tools and services to their patients more often 
than physicians who have no ownership interest.10 Based on these stud-
ies, the law has imposed rules to minimize the effects of these conflicts 
of interest on medical decision-making by limiting physicians’ owner-
ship options and requiring physicians to disclose their ownership inter-
ests.11 
With the PPACA’s retention and strengthening of established dis-
closure rules, it is now time to ask whether these rules are effectively 
protecting patients. Unfortunately, recent research suggests that disclo-
sure does not have the intended effect of allowing patients to choose 
physicians free of financial conflicts of interest and that disclosure may 
actually have the opposite result on patients.12 Indeed, one recent group 
of studies suggests that when patients learn of their physicians’ financial 
interests in the recommended treatment options, patients are actually less 
likely to seek alternative care and more committed to doing what their 
physicians suggest to help their physicians reach such financial goals.13 
This paradoxical result is worsened when patients lose trust in their phy-
sicians’ advice and begin to question whether their physicians have fi-
nancial self-interests or the patients’ best interests in mind when pre-
scribing care.14 
This Article therefore considers possible ways to protect a patient’s 
interest in receiving care and advice that reflects solely what is in the 
patient’s best interest and not what might be in the interest of his or her 
physician’s financial health. Part II reviews the importance of trust in the 
physician–patient relationship and examines how that relationship is af-
fected by the conflict of interest that arises between patients and their 
physicians who own the medical facilities, devices, and treatment ser-
                                                            
 10. See Candeub, supra note 8, at 47; Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, 
at 1405; Sórensen & Grytten, supra note 8, at 497; Sutton, supra note 1, at 20; see also Mireille 
Jacobson et al., Does Reimbursement Influence Chemotherapy Treatment for Cancer Patients?, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 437, 441 (2006) (noting that providers who were “more generously” reimbursed pre-
scribed more costly chemotherapy regimens than other less-generously reimbursed providers). 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn. This statute comes from two previous iterations, known individu-
ally as “Stark I” and “Stark II,” for the sponsor of the bill, Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark of 
California. It was recently amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). For a discussion of the federal and state laws on ownership 
and disclosure, see infra Parts III, IV. 
 12. See Cain, et al., supra note 4; Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4; Sah et al., The Bur-
den of Disclosure, supra note 4. 
 13. Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 15; Sah et al., The Burden of Disclosure, supra 
note 4, at 34. 
 14. Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 15; see also Matthew J. Morris, Secrets Don’t 
Make Friends, But They Do Make Good Business: Perception Versus Reality in Physician Financial 
Incentive Plans, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 245, 255 (2004). 
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vices prescribed. Part III examines the ethical and statutory restrictions 
that have been and are currently imposed on physicians who own facili-
ties or services to which they refer their patients. Part IV reviews the pro-
fessional, state, and federal disclosure requirements imposed on physi-
cians who diagnose and treat patients with devices and services they 
own, and examines the recent research suggesting that the current disclo-
sure requirements may do little to protect patients’ interests or to encour-
age patients to seek alternative care.15 Part V reviews potential alterna-
tives to protect patients in light of such research. Part VI concludes that a 
total ban on physician ownership would solve the problem but, given the 
legal constraints on imposing such a ban, recommends a change in how 
physicians are paid for the medical care they provide. In cases where 
physicians own the equipment they use in the diagnosis and treatment of 
their patients, physicians could be required to bill their patients a flat fee, 
to be disclosed prior to the start of treatment and to cover the entire 
course of their patients’ care.16 This will remove entirely the temptation 
to use diagnostic tools or treatment services for any reason other than the 
best interest of the patient. In light of the empirical findings that patients 
trust their physicians less after learning of their physicians’ financial in-
terests but nevertheless feel compelled to follow their physicians’ advice 
and help them reach their financial goals, medical, legal, and ethics 
scholars and decision makers should confront these realities and adopt a 
model that restores the proper balance between a patient’s best interest 
and a physician’s interest in financial gain. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST AND HOW A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
AFFECTS THAT TRUST 
It is by now axiomatic that before treating patients, physicians must 
obtain their patients’ consent.17 Historically, physicians did not disclose 
risks to their patients, believing that such disclosure might upset the pa-
tient and scare him or her away from treatment the physician believed 
was necessary.18 Indeed, it was not until 1957 that a court first used the 
term “informed consent” when describing the duty of disclosure that is 
                                                            
 15. See Cain, et al., supra note 4; Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4; Sah et al., The Bur-
den of Disclosure, supra note 4. 
 16. See Sutton, supra note 1, at 48 (suggesting payments based on “an episode of care rather 
than a separate fee for each performed”). 
 17. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990); Quintanilla v. 
Dunkelman, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 557, 572 (Ct. App. 2005); Spencer v. Goodill, 17 A.3d 552, 554–55 
(Del. 2011). 
 18. Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present Challenges, 20 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 515, 515 (2011). 
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imposed on a treating physician.19 Today, to obtain meaningful consent, 
physicians must disclose the risks and benefits of using the treatment 
they recommend, foregoing treatment, and using alternative treatment 
options.20 Such disclosure is required because it “promotes communica-
tion and fosters trust” between physicians and the people they treat.21 As 
explained by practicing physicians sensitive to the intimacy of the physi-
cian–patient relationship and the importance of disclosure of risk, the 
“sine qua non of effective patient care is the patient’s trust, manifested as 
an unwavering belief that our advice and decisions are driven by the pa-
tient’s best interest.”22 
When a patient visits a physician, he or she is usually sick and 
simply wants to get better; the patient is not a typical consumer. 23 
“‘Someone who is ill and seeking help—unlike someone who is purchas-
ing a pair of socks or a pound of sausages—is often vulnerable, certainly 
worried, sometimes uncomfortable, and frequently frightened.’”24  The 
patient is also almost always less educated than the physician, at least on 
the subject of his or her health condition, and “has an abject dependence 
upon and trust in his physician for the information upon which he relies 
during the decisional process.”25 
 Even if otherwise educated, an ill patient may be unable to get 
information or make appropriate decisions and, thus, must rely on the 
physician to protect him or her.26 As one scholar observed, “[m]ere ap-
prehension of serious illness transforms us: It makes us afraid and causes 
                                                            
 19. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 
 20. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483 (“‘[A] person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in 
the exercise of control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical 
treatment.’” (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972))). 
 21. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1405. 
 22. Michael J. Mack & Robert M. Sade, Relations Between Cardiothoracic Surgeons and 
Industry, 87 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 1334, 1334 (2009). 
 23. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the 
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 645 (2008) (observing that patients “can rarely 
amass enough information about services and prices to make good decisions about hiring doctors 
and buying care”); see also Christopher Tarver Robertson, Biased Advice, 60 EMORY L.J. 653, 655 
(2011) (noting that a surgical patient seeks health and “prefers to avoid the expenses, pain, inconven-
ience, and risks of needless surgery”). 
 24. Hall & Schneider, supra note 23, at 651 (quoting Raymond Tallis, Commentary: Leave 
Well Alone, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 1756, 1757 (1999)); see also Robertson, supra note 23, at 655 (ob-
serving that surgical patients are “often scared and want to go straight to surgery”). 
 25. Quintanilla v. Dunkelman, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 557, 571 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Cobbs, 502 
P.2d at 9); see also Hall & Schneider, supra note 23, at 670 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (observing that a patient’s “dependence upon the physician for infor-
mation affecting his well-being . . . is well-nigh abject” (ellipsis in original)). 
 26. See Morris, supra note 14, at 253; see also Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 16 
(“Patients are in a vulnerable position with a lack of expertise in medicine, limited experience with 
only a small number of doctors, and they enter the relationship trusting the doctor knows best and 
has their best interests at heart.”). 
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us to regress to childlike states of dependence and wishful thinking. Di-
agnosis of serious illness furthers this transformation, as do disabling 
symptoms.”27 In essence, then, “‘the patient is a captive consumer.’”28 
Unfortunately for these helpless and trusting patients, when physi-
cians have a financial stake in the equipment they use or the facilities to 
which they refer patients, the physicians’ “professional medical judg-
ment may become clouded.”29 Just like “auto mechanics, plumbers, ac-
tors, bicycle messengers, and newspaper reporters,”30 physicians respond 
“‘rationally’” to economic incentives that can interfere with their duty to 
place their patients’ welfare above all else.31 As traditionally defined, a 
conflict of interest is “a set of conditions in which professional judgment 
concerning a primary interest (such as a patient’s welfare . . . ) tends to 
be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain).”32 
Because physicians are paid a fee every time they see patients, they can 
“increase their income by raising fees or providing more services, either 
by treating more patients or by performing more services for existing 
patients.”33 This “fee-for-service” model for paying for health care builds 
into the system an inherent conflict between the physician’s “financial 
incentive to provide more care” and the patient’s interest in getting better 
as quickly and as cheaply as possible.34 Allowing physicians to benefit 
financially from the medical tests and treatments they provide introduces 
the additional potential for financial gain and, with it, the added incentive 
“to act in their own interest.”35 
                                                            
 27. M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 
928 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 
 28. Hall & Schneider, supra note 23, at 652 (quoting Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of 
Med. Exam’rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (Ct. App. 1967)). 
 29. See Morris, supra note 14, at 256 (citing Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing 
Physician Financial Incentives, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1424, 1425 (1999)). 
 30. David A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in Every-
thing Else, 36 AM. SOC’Y L. MED. & ETHICS 370, 371 (2010). 
 31 . Id. at 371 (quoting David Goldhill, How American Health Care Killed My Father,  
ATLANTIC, Sept. 2009, at 38, 40); see also Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts 
of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1993) (noting that in their “most general form,” the 
primary interests of physicians are “the health of patients”). 
 32. Thompson, supra note 31, at 573; see also Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 2 
(defining a conflict of interest as “‘a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judg-
ment or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest’”) 
(quoting INST. OF MED. & BD. OF HEALTH SCI. POL’Y, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL 
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 6 (2009)). 
 33. Rodwin, Medical Commerce, supra note 9, at 387; see also Sandra J. Carnahan, Law, Med-
icine, and Wealth: Does Concierge Medicine Promote Health Care Choice, Or Is It A Barrier To 
Access?, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 123 (2006) (noting that under a fee-for-service model, the 
physician’s financial incentive is “to provide more care”). 
 34. Carnahan, supra note 33, at 123. 
 35. Rodwin, Medical Commerce, supra note 9, at 387; see also Greg Radinsky, Defining a 
Group Practice: An Analysis of the Stark I Final Rule, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1122 (1997) (not-
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A conflict of interest may not actually harm patients and, indeed, 
“may even be a necessary and desirable part of professional practice.”36 
Critics of limiting physician ownership argue that a physician’s financial 
interest in the facility or diagnostic or treatment service to which he or 
she refers patients “creates a strong incentive to ensure that it provides 
high-quality care.”37 But it is “well accepted that patients deserve medi-
cal opinions about treatment plans and referrals unsullied by conflicting 
motives.”38 Even if a physician is not, in fact, motivated by the prospect 
of financial gain, simply “the opportunity for or mere appearance of con-
flict of interest reduces patient trust and causes patients to scrutinize and 
second-guess their physicians’ decisions.”39 Although all physicians be-
lieve that they put their patients interests above all else,40 empirical evi-
dence has established that physicians who refer their patients to facilities 
and services they own order more tests, procedures, and exams than phy-
sicians who do not have that same financial stake.41 
Some of the prescribed procedures may even be unnecessary.42 In-
deed, there is empirical data showing that physicians recommend unnec-
essary tests and treatment because of the potential for financial gain—
and their patients cannot evaluate whether the procedures are needed or 
not.43 Moreover, physicians who stand to gain financially as the cost of 
treatment goes up order more expensive treatment more often than phy-
sicians who lack such financial stakes.44  The question, therefore, be-
comes how best to protect patients from the overutilization of treatment 
                                                                                                                                     
ing that a physician’s “self-referral arrangements present a conflict for the physician who is trying to 
capitalize on an investment and maintain professional ethics”). 
 36. Thompson, supra note 31, at 573. 
 37. Id. (citing Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: Legitimate 
Business or Unethical ‘Entrepreneurialism’, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61 (1989)). 
 38. Morris, supra note 14, at 253 (quoting COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. 
MED. ASS’N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, § 8.06, p. 31 (1986)). 
 39. Morris, supra note 14, at 255. 
 40. Goldhill, supra note 31, at 38, 40. 
 41. See Candeub, supra note 8, at 45, 47; see also McDowell, supra note 37, at 62 (noting the 
argument that physician ownership in health care facilities to which they make patient referrals 
encourages overutilization of medical services and creates a “damaging conflict of interest for physi-
cians”); Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1406 (citing “major” studies 
indicating that physicians who make referrals to facilities they own recommend more tests and pro-
cedures than physicians without ownership interests); Sutton, supra note 1, at 17 (citing empirical 
evidence suggesting that physicians were abusing the referral process to benefit themselves). 
 42. See Candeub, supra note 8, at 47. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Jacobson et al., supra note 10, at 442 (observing that providers who received “more gener-
ous” reimbursements prescribed more costly chemotherapy regimens than the providers who were 
less generously reimbursed); Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interests, supra note 8, at 1406 (not-
ing that physicians who make referrals to facilities they own “recommend more (or more expensive) 
medical tests and procedures than physicians without ownership interests”). 
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and services that has been proven to occur when physicians have a finan-
cial stake.45 
III. REGULATING SELF-REFERRALS BY LIMITING OWNERSHIP 
One way to prevent a physician from referring patients to diagnos-
tic services or treatment facilities that the physician owns is to prohibit 
that ownership. In 1957, the American Medical Association (AMA) did 
just that, directing each physician to limit his professional income only to 
“medical services actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to 
his patients.”46 In 1975, however, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the “learned professions” were not exempt from the federal antitrust 
laws. 47  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision, the Federal Trade 
Commission sued the AMA, challenging its directive limiting physi-
cians’ income, and the AMA dropped the clause in 1979.48 Thereafter, 
sources of income available to physicians changed dramatically, and 
physicians began buying medical facilities and treatment tools and ser-
vices they expected their patients to use.49 Faced with changes to reim-
bursement arrangements under Medicare, which increased limits on re-
imbursements and shifted focus from hospital stays to outpatient care, 
physicians seized the entrepreneurial opportunity presented to them and 
began investing in health-care facilities, laboratories, and diagnostic 
equipment.50 
                                                            
 45. See McDowell, supra note 37, at 61. 
 46. PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 5, § 7. In the preamble to its Principles of 
Medical Ethics, the AMA explained the purpose of the principles: 
These principles are intended to aid physicians individually and collectively in maintain-
ing a high level of ethical conduct. They are not laws but standards by which a physician 
may determine the propriety of his conduct in his relationship with patients, with col-
leagues, with members of allied professions, and with the public. 
Id. pmbl. Section 7 states as follows: 
In the practice of medicine a physician should limit the source of his professional income 
to medical services actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to his patients. His 
fee should be commensurate with the services rendered and the patient’s ability to pay. 
He should neither pay nor receive a commission for referral of patients. Drugs, remedies 
or appliances may be dispensed or supplied by the physician provided it is in the best in-
terests of the patient. 
Id. The current version of the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics is available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics.shtml. See also Am. Med. 
Ass’n v. F.T.C., 638 F.2d 443, 446 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
 47. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). 
 48. See In re Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (holding that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits the AMA from restricting its physician members to advertise for 
and solicit patients and participants in other competitive practices). The AMA unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the FTC’s ruling in federal district court. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 638 F.2d 443 (2d 
Cir. 1980), aff’d, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
 49. Sutton, supra note 1, at 17. 
 50. Id. 
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Prompted by concern over escalating costs of the Medicare pro-
gram that followed this regulatory change, in 1989 Congress ordered the 
Office of Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human 
Services to conduct a study of the financial relationships physicians had 
with health-care facilities, laboratories, medical supply companies, and 
diagnostic equipment and examine whether these relationships affected 
the delivery of care.51 The study analyzed whether a physician’s financial 
interests influenced the recommendations made to his or her patients and 
whether those recommendations increased costs. 52  The results of the 
study indicated that physicians with a financial interest in laboratory test-
ing facilities ordered more laboratory tests—up to forty-five percent 
more—than physicians without that financial interest, adding, at that 
time, more than $28 million in laboratory costs to the Medicare system.53 
In response to these findings, Congress enacted legislation in 1989 
prohibiting a physician from referring a Medicare patient for clinical la-
boratory services to an entity in which the physician, or the immediate 
family member of the physician, had a financial relationship and prohib-
ited the entity from submitting a claim for payment for such a referral.54 
Now known as “Stark I” for the bill’s sponsor, California Congressman 
Fortney “Pete” Stark and for the legislation that followed, this prohibi-
tion of self-referrals was intended to augment a 1972 law prohibiting giv-
ing or taking kickbacks for referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to 
diagnostic or medical testing facilities or labs.55 Similar to the intent of 
the Stark I legislation, the federal “Anti-Kickback” statute was intended 
to remove a physician’s incentive to order “superfluous tests and proce-
dures” and thereby control the increasing costs imposed on the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs.56 Under the current Anti-Kickback law, viola-
tors face civil as well as criminal penalties of up to five years in prison 
and $25,000 in fines.57 
Understanding that violations of the Anti-Kickback statute were 
difficult to prove because of the law’s requirement of proof of 
                                                            
 51. Id. at 18 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS, 
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS & HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES (1989) [hereinaf-
ter DHHS Study]). 
 52. Sutton, supra note 1, at 18 (citing DHHS Study, supra note 51, at iii). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 1877, 103 Stat. 2106; see 
United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 711 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 517 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2011) (originally enacted as Social Security Amendments of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), (c), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419). 
 56. Perry, supra note 7, at 26 (citing § 242(b), (c), 86 Stat. at 1419). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
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knowledge and intent, 58  and in light of physicians’ increasing self-
referrals given their freedom to invest in medical equipment, facilities, 
and services, Representative Stark originally proposed legislation that 
went beyond kickbacks and would have criminalized self-referrals. 59 
Stark’s proposal would also have prohibited the laboratory or facility 
from seeking payment from any source, including Medicare, the patient, 
or the private insurer.60 This proposal met with “stiff opposition” from 
the AMA,61 and the final legislation was much less limiting—prohibiting 
only self-referrals of Medicare patients to clinical laboratories and con-
taining a number of exceptions that allowed physicians to avoid the limi-
tations of the law.62 
Following the enactment of Stark I, several studies confirmed the 
Inspector General’s findings that physicians with a financial stake in di-
agnostic and treatment services recommended those services more often 
than physicians without a financial stake.63 Accordingly, in 1993, Repre-
sentative Stark proposed a comprehensive ban on self-referral.64 Stark’s 
proposal would have extended Stark I’s ban on referrals for clinical la-
boratory services to include a list of other services such as physical ther-
apy, occupational therapy, radiology, and the furnishing of outpatient 
prescription drugs, ambulance services, home infusion therapy, and inpa-
tient and outpatient hospital services.65 The proposal would also have 
extended the ban to all payers, including Medicare, Medicaid, Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, all other commercial carriers, and Health Mainte-
nance Organizations.66 
                                                            
 58. Perry, supra note 7, at 26 (citing Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 
§ 917, 94 Stat. 2599 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2006))); see also Sutton, supra 
note 1, at 18. 
 59. Sutton, supra note 1, at 19; Perry, supra note 7, at 27. 
 60. Perry, supra note 7, at 27 (citing John K. Iglehart, The Debate Over Physician Ownership 
of Health Care Facilities, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 201 (1998)); see also Sutton, supra note 1, at 
17. 
 61. Perry, supra note 7, at 27. Perry notes that not all physicians were opposed and cites certain 
physician organizations, including the American College of Radiology, the American College of 
Surgeons, the American College of Nuclear Medicine, and the American Clinical Laboratory Asso-
ciation, who supported Stark’s proposal. Id. at 27 n.78 (citing MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, 
MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS 127 (1993)). 
 62. Perry, supra note 7, at 27 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-239, § 6204(a), 103 Stat. 2236 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006))); see also Sutton, 
supra note 1, at 19–20. 
 63. See Sutton, supra note 1, at 20–23 (examining nine studies, all confirming overutilization 
by physicians with financial ties). 
 64. Id. at 23 (citing Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act of 1993, H.R. 345, 
103d Cong. (1993)). 
 65. Sutton, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 66. Id. at 23 (citing 139 CONG. REC. E84 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Stark)). 
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Although Stark’s bill did not pass, much of its content was enacted 
and became known as “Stark II.”67 The new law extended the ban on 
self-referrals to payments for Medicaid patients in addition to Medicare 
patients, and it included Stark’s recommendation to ban self-referrals for 
not only laboratory services but also ten “designated health services,” 
including services for physical therapy, occupational therapy, radiology, 
and inpatient and outpatient hospital treatment.68 It did not go as far as 
Stark had proposed, however, and allowed private commercial payers to 
continue to pay for self-referred services.69 
Stark II also contained a number of exceptions, including the 
“whole hospital” exception70 and the “ancillary in-office services” excep-
tion. 71  The whole hospital exception allowed physicians to maintain 
ownership interests in hospitals to which they referred their patients as 
long as the financial interest was “in the entire hospital and not merely in 
a distinct part or department of the hospital.”72 This provision was in-
tended to protect physician-owned hospitals in traditionally underserved 
rural areas, and the consensus in Congress at the time was that any poten-
tial for economic gain was diluted when the referring physicians owned 
the whole hospital and not just the portion to which they referred their 
patients.73 
The PPACA changed the rules on referrals to physician-owned 
hospitals, prohibiting the expansion of those hospitals after March 23, 
2010, and banning any new ones not certified as Medicare providers after 
December 31, 2010.74 With the exception of certain rural providers, phy-
sician-owned hospitals are now prohibited from increasing the number of 
operating rooms, procedure rooms, or beds included in their licenses af-
                                                            
 67. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13562, 107 Stat. 312 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012)). 
 68. Id.; see Sutton, supra note 1, at 23–24 (citing 139 CONG. REC. E84 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1993) 
(statement of Rep. Stark)); Perry supra note 7, at 33 n.80. 
 69. Sutton supra note 1, at 24 (citation omitted). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(3) (2010). 
 71. Id. § 1395nn(b)(2). 
 72. 42 C.F.R. § 411.356(c)(3)(iii) (2011). 
 73. See Perry, supra note 7, at 27 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 4 (2010)). 
 74. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6001(a)(3), 124 Stat. 
119, 685–87 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(3) (2012)). Responding to concerns over the 
inconsistent dates in this provision, the Center for Medicare Services has proposed a rule to resolve 
this inconsistency and to clarify that hospitals that are not physician-owned hospitals as of March 23, 
2010, could not become physician-owned hospitals between then and December 31, 2010. See Med-
icare Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 46432 (proposed Aug. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410–
413, 416, 419, 482, 489) (“[I]f a hospital has no physician ownership or investment as of March 23, 
2010, and later adds physician owners or investors, the hospital will not satisfy the whole hospital 
. . . exceptions.”); see also The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
SERVS. (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/LegislativeUpdate/downloads/PPACA.pdf. 
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ter December 31, 2010, effectively dooming the future of the physician-
owned hospital.75 
The ancillary in-office services exception allowed physicians to di-
agnose and treat their patients using equipment and services they own.76 
In contrast to the limitations it imposed on physician-owned hospitals, 
the PPACA did little to change the ancillary in-office services exception 
contained in Stark II.77  Pursuant to the Stark II exception, physician 
group practices were allowed to own and operate—and receive compen-
sation for—imaging services and other designated health services pro-
vided within their group practices without running afoul of the prohibi-
tion against self-referral.78 This exception allowed physicians to avoid 
the Stark law as long as certain supervision, location, and billing re-
quirements were met and, as many observers argue, essentially swal-
lowed the rule.79 The PPACA amendments do not change the substance 
of the exception but, as described below, impose additional disclosure 
requirements on physicians who self-refer.80 
IV. DISCLOSURE RULES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENTS 
The Stark law has controlled overutilization by limiting referrals by 
physicians who own facilities, tools, and services they recommend to 
their patients and by requiring disclosure of the interests that are allowed 
so that patients may decide for themselves whether to follow this self-
interested advice or to seek care from another physician.81 While the 
PPACA continues to require physicians who self-refer to disclose owner-
ship interests, it further requires physicians to inform patients that such 
                                                            
 75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(2)–(3) (2012); see also Sutton, supra note 1, at 32; Perry supra 
note 7, at 28. As Sutton noted, “‘the clear intent of the provision is to maroon physician owned hos-
pitals in a sort of regulatory purgatory until they eventually wither away entirely or they are pur-
chased by non-physician owners.’” Sutton, supra note 1, at 32 (quoting Victor Moldovan, Will 
Healthcare Reform Kill Surgeon Ownership?, ORTHOPRENEUR, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 33, available at 
https://www.orthoworld.com/site/docs/op/online/2010/marapr/editorial_moldovan.pdf). The amend-
ment has increased the burden on even nonphysician owners, requiring hospitals relying on the 
whole hospital exception to submit annual reports to the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
describing all owners or investors in the hospital and the nature and extent of their ownership or 
investment interests. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(3) (2012). An association of physician-owned hospitals 
challenged this provision in federal district court in Texas on grounds that it is unconstitutionally 
vague and violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Takings Clauses of the United States 
Constitution, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. Physician Hosps. 
of Am. v. Sebelius, 781 F. Supp. 2d 431 (E.D. Tex. 2011). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2) (2010). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id.; Sutton supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 79. See Sutton, supra note 1, at 31; see also Radinsky, supra note 35, at 1149 (noting that the 
economic advantages to the ancillary in-office services exception “cannot be denied”). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2)(B). 
 81. See id. 
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services could be obtained from alternative suppliers and to provide a 
written list of alternative suppliers located in the area in which the pa-
tients reside.82 Now that the Supreme Court has ruled that the balance of 
the PPACA is constitutional, including the more stringent disclosure 
rules, it is appropriate to consider the impact of these disclosure rules on 
patient care.83 
Specialty physician associations’ rules and states’ laws on disclo-
sure impose requirements similar to those in the PPACA, but few have 
gone as far as requiring physicians to furnish written lists of alterna-
tives.84 The AMA cites the current disclosure law and directs its physi-
cians to “provide full disclosure” of their financial interest to their pa-
tients.85 According to the AMA, “full disclosure” requires that the disclo-
sure be in writing and accompanied by a list of “effective alternative re-
sources.”86 The AMA further requires that physicians inform their pa-
tients that they “have the option to use one of the alternative resources” 
and that “they will not be treated differently by the physician if they 
choose an alternative provider or entity.”87 The AMA also reminds phy-
sicians that they “should make referrals to providers based only on the 
needs of the patient and the medical standard of care in order to provide 
quality health care to their patients.”88 According to the AMA, following 
these rules will allow patients “to make informed decisions.”89 Notably, 
however, the AMA acknowledges that these alternative resources may 
not exist.90 
                                                            
 82. Id. 
 83. See generally Cain et al., supra note 4; Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4; Sah et al., 
The Burden of Disclosure, supra note 4. 
 84. See Mack & Sade, supra note 22, at 1334; Morris, supra note 14, at 253 (citing Miller & 
Sage, supra note 29, at 1424); see also AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, CODE OF ETHICS 
AND PROFESSIONALISM FOR ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS § III.B. (2011), http://www6.aaos.org/ 
news/PDFopen/PDFopen.cfm?page_url=http://www.aaos.org/about/papers/ethics/code.asp; Ethical 
Standards for Cardiothoracic Surgeons Relating to Industry, SOC’Y OF THORACIC SURGEONS, 
http://www.sts.org/about-sts/policies/ethical-standards-cardiothoracic-surgeons-relating-industry 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2012). These rules are consistent with well-established rules that medical socie-
ties have imposed on their members who have conflicts of interest with their societies or industry 
interests. See Standards for Commercial Support: Standards to Ensure Independence in CME Activi-
ties, ACCREDITATION COUNCIL CONTINUING MED. EDUC., http://www.accme.org/dir_docs/doc_ 
upload/68b2902a-fb73-44d1-8725-80a1504e520c_uploaddocument.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).  
 85. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, CURRENT OPINIONS & ANNOTATIONS OF 
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFF., Policy 32, Physician Self-Referral, (adopted by Am. Med. Ass’n 
Bd. of Tr., Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://www.acmq.org/policies/policies32and33.pdf. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (stating that patients should be given a list of effective alternative resources, “if any, 
that are reasonably available”). 
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State laws allowing self-referral or use of physician-owned services 
mirror the federal and AMA rules by requiring disclosure of financial 
interest that, in many cases, must be in writing at or prior to the time that 
the referral is made.91 Like the AMA’s rule, some state laws require that 
the written disclosure also include a statement that the patient may obtain 
services from another provider, even though the laws do not require the 
physician to provide a list of alternatives.92 Tennessee, for example, di-
rects physicians with financial interests in health facilities, equipment, or 
pharmaceuticals to disclose the ownership interest “at the time of referral 
and prior to utilization,” and also warns that the “physician shall not ex-
ploit the patient in any way, as by inappropriate or unnecessary utiliza-
tion.”93 The Tennessee statute further states that the “patient shall have 
free choice either to use the physician’s proprietary facility or therapy or 
to seek the needed medical services elsewhere,” although the statute does 
not explicitly require the physician to explain this to his or her patients.94 
The Virginia statute is similar to Tennessee’s, requiring written notice 
“in bold print” that discloses the financial ties and explicitly requiring the 
physician to “advise the patient of his freedom of choice in the selection 
of such facility or entity.”95 North Carolina limits self-referrals to only 
those entities located in a county with a “demonstrated need” where al-
ternative financing is not available, and then only if the physician dis-
closes the investment interest and gives the patients a list of “effective 
alternative facilities.”96 The North Carolina statute also requires physi-
cians to inform their patients of the “option to use one of the alternative 
                                                            
 91. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.5b(a)(2) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-113-40 
(2012); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12AA (West 2012) (requiring physicians to 
disclose their financial ownership interests in physical therapy services if they refer their patients to 
those services); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-7A(c) (2012) (ownership interests excluding in-office 
ancillary services must “be verbally disclosed to each patient or shall be posted in a conspicuous 
place visible to patients in the practitioner’s office”). 
 92. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2837(b)(29) (2012) (defining “[u]nprofessional conduct” 
as including “[r]eferring a patient to a health care entity for services if the licensee has a significant 
investment interest in the health care entity, unless the licensee informs the patient in writing of such 
significant investment interest and that the patient may obtain such services elsewhere”); MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 1-303(b) (West 2012) (requiring a written statement that discloses the owner-
ship interest and states that the patient may choose to obtain the health-care service from another 
health care entity and also requiring that the patient acknowledge receipt of the disclosure in writ-
ing); MINN. STAT. § 147.091(p)(4) (2012) (requiring written disclosure in advance that includes “a 
statement that the patient is free to choose a different health care provider”). 
 93. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-502(b)(1)–(2) (West 2012). Similarly, Massachusetts requires 
physicians to disclose their financial ownership interests in physical therapy services, among others, 
if they refer their patients to those services. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12AA (West 2012). 
 94. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-502(b)(4) (West 2012). 
 95. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2964A (West 2012). 
 96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-408(c) (West 2012). 
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facilities” and to assure them that “they will not be treated differently” by 
the physician if they choose one of the alternatives.97 
The question, however, is whether the disclosure rules actually do 
allow patients to make “informed decisions” about their care.98 Signifi-
cantly, recent studies suggest that disclosure of physicians’ financial ties 
and invitations to go elsewhere do not encourage patients to either ques-
tion their physicians’ ability to provide quality care or seek alternative 
care.99 Studies that have focused on patient behavior after being told of a 
physician’s financial interest in the prescription of certain care suggest 
that disclosure does not protect patients or change the decisions they 
make about their care.100 In fact, “[p]atients rarely abandon doctors, re-
ject doctors’ recommendations, or demand second opinions.”101 Quite to 
the contrary, the physician–patient relationship “often facilitates an at-
mosphere where the patient is reluctant to initiate conflict or question the 
physician’s judgment because the patient must rely on the physician’s 
professional medical judgment.”102 
Consistent with the notion that a sick patient relies “with an abject 
dependence” on the physician to decide on and direct his or her care,103 it 
should come as no surprise that this sick patient does not sever the physi-
cian–patient relationship upon learning that the physician would enjoy 
financial gain from the prescribed course of treatment.104 The fact of the 
matter is, “[t]he patient’s bond with the doctor is neither easily created 
nor lightly sacrificed. Doctor and patient develop information about and 
confidence in each other—information and confidence that must labori-
ously be re-created when the patient changes doctors.”105 
More significantly, studies that have examined the effect of disclo-
sure on patient behavior suggest that disclosure does not always increase 
a patient’s understanding of the treatment options or lead to trust.106 In-
stead of protecting patients’ interests, disclosure actually produces ad-
                                                            
 97. Id. 
 98. See id.; see also Cain et al., supra note 4; Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4; Sah et 
al., The Burden of Disclosure, supra note 4. 
 99. Cain et al., supra note 4; Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4; Sah et al., The Burden of 
Disclosure, supra note 4. 
 100. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 23, at 653. 
 101 . Id. at 652 (citing CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, 
DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998)). 
 102. Morris, supra note 14, at 256. 
 103. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972), cited in Quintanilla v. Dunkelman, 34 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 557, 571 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 104. Hall & Schneider, supra note 23, at 653 (“[I]llness inspires especially ‘thick’ and vital 
personal relationships that patients hate to disturb.”). 
 105. Id. at 652–53. 
 106. Cain et al., supra note 4, at 7; Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 5. 
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verse effects.107 When disclosure alerts a patient to his or her physician’s 
chance for financial gain, the patient feels obliged to help the physician 
maximize the gain.108 The patient is afraid to reject the physician’s rec-
ommendation because rejection would signal distrust of the physician 
that would, in turn, endanger present as well as future care.109 
The paradoxical outcome is that the patient is uncomfortable reject-
ing the physician’s advice even though he or she mistrusts the advice; 
thus, instead of encouraging patients to seek an independent opinion, 
disclosure of conflicts of interest makes it more likely that they will fol-
low their physicians’ untrustworthy advice.110 In short, disclosure of fi-
nancial interest might protect physicians against allegations by their pa-
tients of abuse of trust or fair dealing, but it does little to protect patients 
from the impact that financial interest has on a physician’s—even an 
honest physician’s—treatment decisions.111 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
If disclosure actually makes it harder for patients to protect them-
selves by challenging their physicians’ advice or seeking alternative care, 
then one solution would be to prohibit physicians from disclosing their 
financial interests—which would, at least, remove the added pressure 
patients feel to help their physicians maximize their financial interests.112 
Indeed, one observer has suggested that a patient who wants to be sure 
that he or she receives the best advice can hire an “advisor” who is free 
of financial ties to the machines, drugs, or location for the care the pa-
tient will ultimately receive and who could provide the patient with unbi-
ased advice about what care to choose and where and whom to go to for 
that care.113 This approach would treat patients similar to other consum-
ers in a free market; however, it conflicts with the underlying premise 
that patients are not typical consumers but rather “captive” consumers 
lacking the bargaining power or understanding to protect themselves.114 
Keeping patients ignorant of their physicians’ financial interests in 
recommended tools and services is also antithetical to the widely accept-
                                                            
 107. Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 15; Sah et al., The Burden of Disclosure, supra 
note 4, at 32–33. 
 108. Sah et al., The Burden of Disclosure, supra note 4, at 6 (describing a “panhandler effect” 
when a physician discloses his interest in financial gain and the patient feels obligated to help the 
physician obtain it). 
 109. Id.; see also Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 6. 
 110. Sah et al., Patient Anxiety, supra note 4, at 15. 
 111. Sutton, supra note 1, at 23 (citing 139 CONG. REC. E1116–17 (daily ed. May 3, 1993) 
(statement of Rep. Stark)). 
 112. See Sah et al., The Burden of Disclosure, supra note 4, at 6. 
 113. Robertson, supra note 23, at 665. 
 114. Hall & Schneider, supra note 23, at 652; see also Bloche, supra note 27, at 928. 
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ed principle that patients have the right to know all of the risks and bene-
fits of any proposed treatment.115 Consistent with a patient’s right to 
know all information that may affect his or her care, current laws and 
ethical rules require that physicians disclose their financial ties to the 
tools and services they recommend to patients.116 Medical societies have 
traditionally defined their own rules of disclosure, and allowing these 
societies to do so is consistent with “the collective belief that physicians 
are competent, compassionate professionals, acting solely for their pa-
tients’ best interests.”117 Indeed, until the last part of the twentieth centu-
ry, medicine remained a largely self-governed enterprise and the center-
piece of this self-governance was a “fidelity to patients regardless of self-
interest” that was widely regarded as desirable from a social welfare per-
spective.118 Self-regulation, alone, however, has proven not to be enough. 
As research has confirmed, when physicians can make more money by 
ordering certain tests or prescribing a certain course of treatment, they 
do—regardless of whether it is in the best interest of the patient to do 
so.119 
This empirical evidence, therefore, has justified governmental regu-
lation.120 As already described, the PPACA requires, as the profession 
and existing law has long required, that physicians disclose their finan-
cial ties.121 The Act goes further than the traditional disclosure rules be-
cause it not only requires a written disclosure that includes a list of alter-
native providers but also expands the Stark prohibitions on self-referrals 
by requiring physicians to report their ownership interests to the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services.122 The law could go even further, as 
at least one insurer has done, and require a physician to withhold treat-
ment until a patient actually receives a second opinion from someone on 
that list.123 
Additionally, to inform patients fully, physicians ought to disclose 
not only their financial stake in the treatment decisions their patients 
                                                            
 115. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). 
 116. See supra Part IV. 
 117. See Morris, supra note 14, at 253 (citing Steven D. Pearson et al., Ethical Guidelines for 
Physician Compensation Based on Capitation, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 689 (1998)). 
 118. Bloche, supra note 27, at 924. 
 119. See Candeub, supra note 8, at 47; Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, 
at 1405. 
 120. Candeub, supra note 8, at 46–47. 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 122. Id. §1395nn(b)(2). 
 123. See Robertson, supra note 23, at 663 (noting an example where a health insurer required a 
patient to obtain a second opinion before following the advice of a physician with financial ties to 
the treatment he suggested (citing Damare v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. Med. Care Plan, No. 92-
1779, 1993 WL 92503, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1993))). 
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make but also the empirical studies proving that physicians who own 
diagnostic tools and treatment services recommend them to their patients 
more often than physicians who do not have that same financial stake.124 
Currently, no disclosure rules require physicians who own testing and 
other services to which they refer their patients to disclose that they are 
more likely to recommend these tests and services simply because they 
own those services, even though that fact has been proven time and time 
again.125 Actually, to be “fully” informed, in addition to knowing that 
their physicians have a financial interest in the recommended services, 
“patients need to know that virtually every major study indicates that 
physicians who make referrals to medical facilities they own recommend 
more (or more expensive) medical tests and procedures than physicians 
without ownership interests.”126 Armed with this information, patients 
might be less likely to agree to submit to a certain procedure or test, or at 
least more likely to seek a second opinion.127 
If disclosure does not protect patients against their physicians’ in-
terest in maximizing financial gain, then the law could prohibit physi-
cians from having that financial stake, as the AMA once attempted to 
do.128 Although federal antitrust laws prevented the AMA from continu-
ing to impose this prohibition, medical research scientists instituted such 
a prohibition and abolished all ties to industry in an attempt to avoid in-
dustry interference.129 Indeed, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and 
many universities either banned or closely regulate investments of any 
kind in health-related corporate entities.130 After alleged misconduct be-
tween its researchers and the corporate sponsors of that research, Har-
vard University “forbade faculty researchers from participating in com-
pany-sponsored basic or clinical research if they had more than token 
investments in or had received consulting fees from those companies,” 
and Harvard toughened these rules in 2000 and again in 2004.131 
                                                            
 124. Candeub, supra note 8, at 47; Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 
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 125. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 126. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1406. 
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Such efforts at self-regulation, however, were met with strong op-
position. 132  As already noted, the AMA’s definition of appropriate 
sources of income for physicians was found to violate federal antitrust 
laws.133 In addition to these legal impediments, there are also cogent ar-
guments for why physicians should be able to invest in the tools and ser-
vices they recommend, including the fact that ownership creates the in-
centive, as in any competitive market, to offer the highest quality care.134 
In the research science area, it was argued that bans on industry support 
were counterproductive and interfered with progress.135 One critic of the 
NIH rules stated, “Had these rules been in force in the 1970s and 1980s, 
they would have prevented the scientists who were founding the biotech-
nology industry from making their breakthrough contributions.”136  In 
fact, a complete ban in industry as well as in medical practice may not be 
advisable, and in the physician–patient context, a complete prohibition of 
financial ties is unlikely to be widely accepted, even if it was not a re-
straint of trade.137 
The most appropriate solution, therefore, may rest on a clearer fo-
cus on the problem.138 When considering how to handle a physician’s 
financial ties that impact patient care, one must note that “[a] conflict of 
interest does not necessarily result in harm to a patient; whether the out-
come of a conflict is good or bad depends on how it is managed.”139 An 
appropriate solution need not eliminate the prospect of financial invest-
ment but should prevent physicians’ interests in financial gain “from 
dominating or appearing to dominate the relevant primary interest in the 
making of professional decisions.”140 Even though the law regulates but 
cannot, and probably should not, ban physician ownership of the busi-
ness of medicine, lawmakers and physicians must identify the best way 
to protect patients from their physicians’ interest in financial gain. “Just 
because we cannot do much about the other secondary interests, it does 
not follow that we should do little about financial gain.”141 
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If the problem is that physicians act to maximize their financial 
gain when they are given the opportunity, the law should remove that 
incentive by requiring physicians who own tools and services to charge a 
flat fee for the entire course of their patients’ care, regardless of how 
many of their own tests or services their patients use.142 This model could 
mimic either Medicare’s diagnosis-based system, where government ad-
visors recommend appropriate fees, or the more recently defined conci-
erge-like medical practices, where fees are based on what the market will 
bear.143 While choosing the most appropriate flat-fee model will present 
its own challenges, the model would avoid antitrust violations that a 
complete ban on ownership could not avoid and, at the same time, would 
remove entirely the temptation to overutilize diagnostic tools and ser-
vices owned by treating physicians.144 Requiring physicians to charge a 
flat fee would remove all risk that they are recommending any test or 
treatment for their financial self-interest because, no matter how many 
tests they order or treatment alternatives they suggest, their financial gain 
would remain the same.145 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of 
those PPACA provisions that are relevant here and that strengthen the 
disclosure requirements, it is time for the legal and medical professions 
to rethink how to best protect the interests of patients in receiving the 
best possible health care. Recent research suggests that patients feel 
compelled to help their physicians reach their financial goals once they 
are aware of their physicians’ financial interests, even though these pa-
tients lose trust in their physicians’ advice. Thus, medical, legal, and eth-
ics scholars and decision makers should confront these realities. Instead 
of imposing additional disclosure requirements, they should remove the 
incentive by adopting a flat-fee billing model. This approach will restore 
the proper balance between a patient’s best interest and a physician’s 
interest in financial gain. 
                                                            
 142. See Carnahan, supra note 33, at 122 (examining the quality of health care based on a flat-
fee concierge service model); Sutton, supra note 1, at 48 (suggesting payments based on “an episode 
of care”). 
 143. See Carnahan, supra note 33, at 122. 
 144. Sutton, supra note 1, at 48. 
 145. See Carnahan, supra note 33, at 121–22. 
